A time series t=921 of weekly survey data on vote intentions in the Netherlands for the period [1978][1979][1980][1981][1982][1983][1984][1985][1986][1987][1988][1989][1990][1991][1992][1993][1994][1995] shows that the percentage of undecided voters follows a cyclical pattern over the election calendar. The otherwise substantial percentage of undecided voters decreases sharply in weeks leading up to an election and gradually increases afterwards. This paper models the dynamics of this asymmetric electoral cycle using arti cial neural networks, with the purpose of estimating when the undecided voters start making up their minds. We nd that they begin to decide which party t o v ote for nine weeks before a rst order national parliamentary election and one to four weeks before a second order election, depending on the type of election European Parliament, Provincial States, City-councils. The e ect of political campaigns and the implications for political analysis are discussed.
Introduction
For most people voting is not instantaneous. They typically do not have to wait until election day t o know which political party they tend to favor. The identi cation of these people with one of the major parties is the long-term in uence on the vote which, under normal' circumstances, determines in large part the election outcome. However, next to these early-deciders or precommitted partisans there often are many undecided voters, even late in some election campaigns, and last-minute deciders. Dutch opinion polls suggest that the size of this group of undecided voters is quite substantial in the Netherlands. During periods when no elections are ahead up to 30 of the eligible adult electorate fails to mention a party when asked which party they would vote for if elections were held that day. This percentage declines precipitously to approximately 15 in weeks leading up to an election. Hence election outcomes also are, at least in part, the result of relatively sudden changes in the undecided voters' feelings about candidates and political parties in the nal few weeks or days or even hours of an election campaign. As we will see, the recurring changes in the percentage of undecided voters appear in a cyclical fashion, driven by national parliamentary elections. The quantitative study of these electoral cycles is a relatively new eld of investigation in political research B urklin 1987. Most of the attention from political scientists has been directed towards noncyclical phenomena and many traditional theories of political participation would interpret the cycles as a deviation from equilibrium or the`normal' circumstances. This paper is a straightforward test of the theory of short electoral cycles formulated by several authors, recently by Stray and Silver 1983, Reif 1984 , and Van der Eijk 1987 1 . It uses a time series of survey-based vote intentions in the Netherlands and attempts to pinpoint the timing of vote decisions, that is, it considers the issue of how long before an election undecided voters make up their minds for which party t o v ote.
A v ariety of factors can be proposed to explain the process that moves the undecided voters through the electoral cycle. One is the suggestive covariation between the phases of the cycle and political party campaigning. During election campaigns political parties attempt to mobilize voters by modern campaign technologies and by heavy use of mass media. Campaign resources are poured into political advertising and media image making, and political candidates and their campaign sta temporarily shape the media 1 The short-term electoral cycle examined here is obviously not to be confused with the cyclical pattern of election periods -realigning, stable alignment, and dealigning -across long stretches of time in American history see, for example, Beck 1979 . According to the periodicity principle of the partisan realigment theory, past American politics has followed regular cycles of stability and change in voter preference for the full sweep of electoral history see Chubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 1980 . Our data more closely resemble the cyclical pattern in by-election results as described by Stray and Silver 1983, 49 : the support for the government declining after a general election, being at its lowest in mid-term, and then increasing as the next general election approaches" See also Reif 1985 , Van der Eijk 1987 agenda. This would be particularly true for Dutch national parliamentary elections, where extensive media coverage is provided 2 and where mass media organizations often commission or report public opinion polls. The exposure of these polls and early projections may a ect the intention to vote either in a bandwagon or an underdog direction see Kavanagh 1981 , Marsh 1984 . It therefore seems plausible to assume that exposure to media coverage of elections, especially television coverage, would stimulate the intention to go and vote, although, as Morgan and Shanahan 1992 and Weaver 1996 note, heavy media emphasis on campaign strategy and maneuvering can also make some voters more cynical and less likely to vote. Television, Morgan and Shanahan 1992 argue, may narcotize and depolitize the viewing audience and thereby discourage participation.
Furthermore, mass media exposure to election campaigns are often hypothesized as in uencing beliefs about the closeness of the election race, and some political observers tend to believe that more competitive election races increase vote intention and voter turnout see Hofstetter 1973 , Zimmer 1981 , Cox and Munger 1989 , and Aldrich 1993 . The premise is that in a close race with no apparent front-runner the election outcome is less certain. This uncertainty generates more interest among the public over the outcome, which in turn becomes a stimulus leading more of the public to participate by voting than would be the case when the election is a landslide or perceived to be one-sided. A close election also provides rational reasons for people to vote. In a close race, more citizens may vote because they believe that each individual vote counts more and that their participation has a greater chance of a ecting the outcome 4 . Another explanation of why closeness is related to turnout is that parties respond to closeness with greater e ort at mobilization and get-out-the-vote campaigns Cox and Munger 1989 . In close-fought contests, an e ective campaign can make the di erence between victory and defeat.
A somewhat related explanation is that political campaigns intensify voters' feelings about politics which drives up their vote intention. In weeks leading up to an election political competition and intraparty con ict typically increase. Where current political controversies are deeply felt by large numbers of people, vote intentions should rise above preceding levels. Hence, pre-election periods are times in which party di erences as per-2 In the Netherlands there are no political campaign commercials on television during general elections. Instead, the parties are given free air time to present their program to the electorate in a series of political broadcasts.
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It should be noted that electoral studies have t ypically con rmed the closeness-turnout link hypothesis but most microlevel studies have denied any link see Nownes 1992 . Hence it may be that the hypothesis su ers an aggregation bias Matsusaka 1993. 4 Obviously even in close-fought mass elections the instrumental value of voting is trivial because the probability of a single vote being pivotal is negligible -the`paradox of not voting ' Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974 . This is not to suggest that self-interest maximizing individuals will not participate in national elections because there is an in nitesimal probability that they could end up in a position to cast the decisive v ote. For many the costs of voting are small and there may be albeit low bene ts involved in not abstaining see Aldrich 1993. ceived by the electorate appear to be sharpest and, thus, the best guide to make a decision.
There are therefore compelling reasons for giving the correspondence between political campaigning and the electoral cycle a causal interpretation. The mobilization e orts of parties during election campaigns do not necessarily result in long-term allegiances however. Many people vote, if at all, for the candidate, not the party, and having done so, abdicate partisan preferences. Moreover, the recurring increases in the numberof undecided voters during post-election periods may be a response to the perceived gap between campaign promises and incumbentgovernment performance. Unrealistically high initial expectations about what parties or the government will accomplish give w a y to disappointment at some time after the election Stimson 1976, Sigelman and Knight 1985 . Moreover, while the intention to vote for the parties who have won the election typically increases shortly after the election itself, presenting a`halo' e ect or a`post electoral euphoria' that may e v en drive their popularity a b o v e the value expressed at the election result, voters for losing parties may temporarily be depressed and demobilized Reif 1984 Reif , 1985 . This may result in a loss of interest in politics, resignation and, in subsequent elections, nonvoting. Of course, this two-way switching of mobilization of winners and withdrawal by losers may cancel at the aggregate level of vote intention.
Although these explanations for the cyclical dynamics of vote intention pertain to all general elections, they are particularly relevant to what Reif and Schmitt 1980 call rst order elections, i.e., those which allocate the most powerful and important political o ces in a country. In the Netherlands, as in all parliamentary systems, these are the elections for the National Parliament. They constitute the most competitive contest because there is much at stake. Elections which are held in between the national parliamentary elections are the less-competitive second order elections. In the Netherlands these are the elections for the European Parliament, Provincial States, and City-councils. In these less-at-stake elections abstaining is generally perceived to have less serious consequences. This paper examines the in uence of rst and second order elections on the percentage of undecided voters. The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and speci es our research questions. The data show complicated dynamic patterns which hint t o w ards potential nonlinear structure. We consider the use of arti cial neural networks ANNs , which is also motivated by the speci c nature of our research questions. Section 3 brie y outlines some key features of ANNs. In contrast to much empirical research in this area, we do not treat this model as a`black b o x' but, on the contrary, w e explicitly use it components for inference. Section 4 presents our empirical results for the weekly series of undecided voters and Section 5 provides interpretations of our ndings and implications for political analysis.
2 The data and the research questions The data we use are taken from the NIPO Inc.'s Omnibus survey, a w eekly survey based on personal interviews of a random cross-section sample of the Dutch population of age 18 and over. The number of respondents to the surveys equals just over 1,000 on average. A detailed description of the NIPO surveys is given in Eisinga and Felling 1992 Figure  1 . Circles, cubes, triangles, and diamonds indicate elections for National and European Parliament, Provincial States, and City-councils, respectively. The exact election dates from 1974 to 1995 are listed in Table 1 .
-insert Figure 1 --insert Table 1 - As indicated, the most striking feature of this time series is its typical cyclical pattern. This cycle is closely connected to the dates of the rst order national parliamentary elections: few weeks after each such election, the percentage of undecided voters starts displaying an upward movement, which gradually levels o and changes int o a d o wnward movement in weeks leading up to the next election. We de ne these periods of upward and downward movement as post-election and pre-election regimes, respectively, and one post-and one pre-election regime together constitute an election cycle. This election cycle is seen to be rather asymmetric, as the post-election regime in general lasts much longer than the pre-election regime, notable exceptions being the cycles following the regularly scheduled election held in May 1981 and the early election of September 1982 caused by the untimely fall of the coalition government. As such asymmetry in general cannot be modeled using linear time series models 5 , it seems likely that some nonlinear structure is present in the data.
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This conjecture is based on the election cycle's similarity with the business cycle, where upward and downward movements correspond to expansions and recessions, respectively. Asymmetry in the business cycle has been documented extensively, see Ramsey and Rothman 1996 and Sichel 1993 for recent discussions, and is generally modeled using nonlinear models.
Second order elections i.e., those for European Parliament, Provincial States, and City-councils seem to hamper the general cyclical pattern as they cause a temporary decline, which is restored fairly quickly after the particular election has been held and is not followed immediately by another election. If we disregard the election cycle, there seems to be a slight upward trend in the percentage of undecided voters, at least until 1994. This trend towards less party voting parallels the well-known and much-maligned decline in electoral turnout rates in many Western industrial democracies in the past few decades e.g., Sha er 1981, Abramson and Aldrich 1982 , Chen 1992 , Flickinger and Studlar 1992 , Armingeon 1994 , Fenster 1994 , and Nardulli, Dalager, and Greco 1996 . It is fairly well accepted, although not always rigorously documented, that this decline is generated, among others, by long-term factors such as a decline in the saliency of politics for most citizens, a decline in the attachment o f v oters to parties and an increase in political alienation, especially a rise in feelings of powerlessness or lack of e cacy, and apathy see Sha er 1981, Abramson and Aldrich 1982 , Chen 1992 , Aldrich 1993 , Armingeon 1994 , and Southwell 1995 . These changes may obviously bethe result of the turnover of electoral generations and of other structural changes such as a shifting age distribution. Moreover, as can be seen in both Figure 1 and Table 1 , the election calendar has frequently called Dutch voters to the polls. The increased number of elections may h a v e gradually devaluated the importance of any single election and may have induced voter fatigue. From August 1992 until approximately June 1993, there is a slight decrease which cannot beascribed to a de facto election. This anomaly might be attributed to the fact that during this period early elections were foreseen. At the time, the Dutch coalition cabinet faced great internal disagreement o v er several policy reviews and many people anticipated the demise of the coalition government and thus an early election. The major issue in the media, for example, was not whether there would be an early election but when. The multiparty coalition ultimately experienced no early termination however. It averted the crisis and remained in o ce for the complete term until the next regular scheduled election of May 1994.
In this paper, we formally investigate the in uence of rst and second order elections on the percentage of undecided voters. More speci cally, we address the following three questions.
1. How long before an election does the downward movement in the percentage of undecided voters begin?
2. What is the size of the downward movement, i.e., how large is the decline in percentage points?
3. Do rst and second order elections have similar e ects on the decline in the percentage of undecided voters with respect to timing and magnitude?
We address these questions in the context of arti cial neural network ANN models. As explanatory variables in our models we use lagged values of the percentage of undecided voters, denoted y t , a s w ell as the numberofweeks until and after the various elections held in the Netherlands. We denote the latter as t u;j and t a;j , respectively. The subscript j is used to identify the type of election, j = N P ; E P ; P S , or C Ccorresponding to elections for National and European Parliaments, Provincial States, and City-councils, respectively. The variables t u;j and t a;j have been rescaled by dividing them by the maximum numberof weeks between two elections of the same type which equals 260, for elections for European Parliament are held once in every ve y ears and subtracting this from 1. This transformation guarantees that the`until' and`after' variables are equal to one at the time of elections of the corresponding type 6 , which facilitates interpretation of the NN-estimation results, as will be discussed below. In the next section, we provide some background information about ANN models.
Arti cial Neural Networks
Arti cial neural network models, or simply arti cial neural networks ANNs , have been adopted from cognitive science, and are inspired by the way information is thought t o b e processed in the human brain. Although ANNs are`merely' nonlinear regression models, perhaps because of their origin there is some mystique associated with them, which is accentuated by the rather exotic names given to the various ingredients of ANNs, such a s input and output units, connection strengths, neurons, hidden layers, and activation functions. We refer the interested reader to Ripley 1993 Ripley , 1994 Ripley , 1996 for general introductions to ANN models. Here we restrict attention to one particular form of these models, called the single layer feedforward neural network model, which takes the form,
where y t ; t = 1; : : : ; T is the output or dependent variable, z t is a vector of input or explanatory variables, consisting of lagged endogenous and exogenous variables, i.e., in our case z t = 1 ; z t 0 , z t = y t , 1 ; : : : ; y t , p ; t u;N P ; : : : ; t a;CC 0 . The activation functions F in the q so-called hidden units, j F , are taken to be logistic functions, i.e., F w = 1=1 + exp,w. Finally, the " t is assumed to be a white noise process.
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In order to adequately capture the fact that the trough of the election cycle is reached after the election has been held, tu;j is set equal to 1 in the week immediately following an election of type j as well.
The ANN model with one hidden layer as given in 1 is the most popular form in applications to economic time series, see, e.g., Kuan and White 1994 , Kuan and Liu 1995 , and Swanson and White 1995 . It is seen that such an ANN really is nothing more than a regression model with a time-varying constant, where at each point i n time the value of the intercept is determined by the values taken by the hidden units. However, if the number of hidden units, q, is taken su ciently large, the single layer feedforward ANN 1 provides a very exible modeling tool, which can accomodate a wide variety of dynamic patterns in the variable of interest, y t .
In much empirical research, ANNs are treated as a`black box', with the researcher having little knowledge, let alone control, of what is going on in the model or why particular results are obtained. In contrast, we explicitly employ the structure of the ANN to obtain interpretable results and draw empirical inference regarding the impact of the various types of elections on the percentage of undecided voters. For that purpose, we impose a particular structure on the so-called connection weights j . First of all, we include four hidden units into the model in which the j 's are restricted in such a way that each of these units is governed only by a single`until' variable, that is, j is such that the argument of the activation function in the j-th hidden unit, 0 j z t , can bewritten as 0 j z t = u;j t u;j , u;j , where j = N P ; E P ; P S ; C C . In the sequel, we will use the shorthand notation F u;j ; j = N P ; E P ; P S ; C C , to denote the resulting activation functions. We impose the identifying restriction u;j 0, such that the function F u;j changes from zero to one as t u;j becomes larger. Because of the transformation which is applied to the time until elections of type j see Section 2, the j-th hidden unit becomes active whenever elections of type j approach only if these elections have a n y impact on the percentage of undecided voters of course. The parameter u;j can be tentatively interpreted as the time when the j-th unit becomes active, as F u;j = :5 when t u;j = u;j . 7 The other parameter in F u;j , u;j , indicates whether the transition from inactive to active is gradual u;j small or fast u;j large. Concerning the time after elections, recall that the election cycle appears to be driven by the time relative to elections for National Parliament. As will be evident from Figure 1 , the impact of the second order elections for European Parliament, Provincial States, and City-councils is relatively small when compared to the e ects of the rst order elections for National Parliament. For this reason, we only allow the time after elections for National Parliament, t a;N P , to enter the model. In a similar vein as discussed above, we include this variable by adding another hidden unit which is controlled by t a;N P only, i.e., with 7
Note that this interpretation of u;j as the starting point of the election e ect is valid only if u;j is large, such that Fu;j changes almost instantaneously from zero to one as tu;j becomes larger than u;j . If u;j is small, the j-th hidden unit becomes active m uch earlier, as Fu;j is already nonzero long before tu;j becomes equal to u;j . 0 j z t = a;N P t a;N P , a;N P ; a;N P 0. Finally, t o accomodate temporal dependence in our time series, we add four lagged values of the endogenous variable as well. Hence, our basic model is given by,
u;j F u;j t u;j , u;j + a;N P F a;N P t a;N P , a;N P +" t : 2
The ANN 2 implicitly assumes that only the level of the series changes over time. However, the dependence between consecutive observations might change as well. Comparing autocorrelations for subsamples consisting of observations shortly before election dates and of other observations not reported here reveals that this indeed seems to be the case. It is straightforward to extend the ANN 2 to allow for varying autoregressive parameters as well, by augmenting the intercepts u;j in the hidden units with linear combinations P p i=1 i;j y t,i , for j = N P ; E P ; P S ; C C . With four hidden units, the numberof parameters to beestimated would increase substantially. Moreover, the parameters i;j are estimated using only a small number of observations, as the hidden units are expected to become active only in the nal few weeks before elections, which are held only four or ve times during the sample period. Therefore, we will assume that the coe cients corresponding to lagged y t 's are a ected in the same way by each type of election, and that the e ect of two elections which are close by is the same as that of isolated elections. These restrictions can conveniently be incorporated by extending model 2 as follows,
i y t,i 1 , C C j = N P 1 , F u;j t u;j , u;j + C C X j = N P u;j F u;j t u;j , u;j + a;N P F a;N P t a;N P , a;N P + " t :
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To understand that the multiplicative term 1, C C j = N P 1,F u;j in 3 serves our purpose, note that it equals zero in times when no elections are close by a s a l l F u;j are then equal to zero. When an election of type j approaches, F u;j changes from zero to one, 1 , F u;j does the opposite, C C j = N P 1 , F u;j also switches from one to zero, such that the complete term changes from zero to one. Also note that if two elections are that close that their individual hidden units become active simultaneously the multiplicative term still equals one. In order to distinguish model 3 from model 2, we will call the former a multiplicative neural network MNN . In the next section we discuss and interpret estimates of the ANN and MNN models 2 and 3 for our weekly time series of percentages of undecided voters.
Results
In this section we discuss estimates of the models 2 and 3 for the weekly observed percentage of undecided voters in the Netherlands. We also estimate models with certain restrictions imposed to investigate similarities between di erent types of elections. To choose between the di erent models, we use the Akaike and Schwarz Information Criteria AIC and SIC, respectively . These criteria are computed as AIC = ln 2 " + 2 k=T and SIC = ln 2 " +k lnT =T , where 2 " is the residual variance and k is the number of estimated parameters in the model. Granger et al. 1995 advocate the use of such criteria for model selection because in this approach no particular model is favored a priori . An obvious drawback of this procedure is that all competing models have to be estimated, which can become rather time-consuming if the numberofrelevant alternative models is large. Throughout we include four lagged values of the dependent v ariable in the model, i.e., we set p in 2 and 3 equal to 4. A dummy v ariable D t , which equals 1 in week 81.43 and zero otherwise is also included. The outlier in this single week, which is clearly visible in Figure  1 , is caused by a failure of the survey organization's error-control procedure resulting in a one-of-a-kind overrepresentation of undecided voters composed largely of misclassi ed early deciders.
In general, estimation of ANN models is hampered by the fact that the model is not identi ed, and that the hidden units tend to be highly correlated. For that reason, quite complicated and ambiguous estimation procedures have to be used to estimate ANNs. In contrast, because of the structure we h a v e imposed on the hidden units, our ANN models in 2 and 3 are identi ed. Although we still expect the hidden units to becorrelated to some extent as elections of di erent types are often held quite close to each other, we decide to estimate our models using nonlinear least squares.
Constant autoregressive parameters
First of all, we consider the ANN model 2 with constant autoregressive parameters. The model is estimated as follows, where standard errors are given in parentheses below the parameter estimates. The impact of elections can be decomposed in`timing' and`magnitude', cf. questions 1 and 2, respectively, as posed in Section 2. Franses and Draisma 1997 suggest to examine plots of the values taken by the hidden units over time to get some idea of the contribution of the various nonlinear components to the overall model output. Here we use this graphical device to assess the timing aspect of the in uence of the di erent t ypes of elections. The activation functions F u;j multiplied by 10, in order to increase visibility in 4 have been graphed in Figure 2 for each t ype of election separately.
-insert Figure 2 - It is seen that the hidden unit corresponding to a particular type of election becomes active only a short while before elections are held. The estimates of the constants u;j give an indication of the length of this period. The estimates standard errors in parentheses are given as u;N P = 0:9660:032; u;EP = 0:9810:019; u;P S = 0:9960:001, and u;CC = 0:9830:013. Translated back into numberof weeks prior to election these estimates become 9, 4, 1, and 4. That is, 9 weeks before elections for National Parliament are held does the number of undecided voters start decreasing, etc., see also Table 2 . The unreported estimates of u;j are very large, such that the value of the activation function F u;j switches almost instantaneously from 0 to 1 as the numberofweeks until elections of type j becomes equal to the numberofweeks implied by the estimates of u;j .
-insert Table 2 where I j y T ,s+l = 0 if l 0. When computing the impact of elections for National Parliament we should take into account the e ect of the hidden unit corresponding to the time after these elections, F a;N P . As the output of this unit is rather small shortly before elections we neglect it for simplicity. Using the estimates in 4, the impact of the elections for National and European Parliaments, Provincial States and City-councils in the week the elections are being held, I j y T , are estimated to be 8.81, 2.83, 3.02, and 3.59 percentage points in absolute value. Especially for the rst order national parliamentary elections this seems to be a rather modest decrease, also because Figure 1 suggests that the decline at the time of these elections seems much larger. However, it should be observed that, except for 1981, other elections are held just before or just after the elections for national parliament. Hence, the total decline is an accumulation of impacts of di erent elections. This point is also illustrated in Figure 3 . The middle panel of this Figure shows the values of the activation functions for all elections simultaneously. This graph reveals that, due to the proximity of di erent elections, the di erent hidden units are activated almost immediately following each other. In fact, sometimes more than one hidden unit is active. In the lower panel of Figure 3 , the hidden unit corresponding to the time after elections for National Parliament is also shown. It is seen that the output of this unit changes very slowly. Among others, this suggests that it takes quite a long time before the percentage of undecided voters is back at its pre-election high level, which amounts to clear evidence of asymmetry in the data.
-insert Figure 3 Similarities between di erent t ypes of elections can be examined by testing restrictions on the hidden units F u;j and or the parameters u;j . We estimate several special cases of 2 and compare the values of the model selection criteria AIC and SIC. First of all, it is of interest to examine whether the elections have any impact at all. This question is adressed by estimating model 2 without the hidden units controlled by the time until the various elections. In Table 3 , the values for the model selection criteria are given in the row u;N P = u;EP = u;P S = u;CC = 0. A second question of interest is whether the timings of the election e ects are signi cantly di erent from each other. For that purpose, model 2 is estimated with the restrictions u;N P = u;EP = u;P S = u;CC u and u;N P = u;EP = u;P S = u;CC u imposed. This renders an estimate of u = 0:984 and u still very large and AIC and SIC values as shown in Table 3 , in the row F u;N P = F u;EP = F u;P S = F u;CC F u . Similarly, we test whether the second order elections for European Parliament, Provincial States, and City-councils have any impact u;EP = u;P S = u;CC = 0, and if so, whether they di er from each other with respect to timing F u;EP = F u;P S = F u;CC F u .
-insert Table 3 - The values of the information criteria for the various variants of the ANN in Table 3 indicate that the AIC favors the unrestricted model 4, in which all elections are allowed to have di erent e ects. The model in which the timing of the e ects of second-order elections are equal is a close competitor, and is preferred by the SIC. Hence we conclude that the hidden units contribute to explaining the movements in the percentage of undecided voters. According to AIC, rst order and second order elections start to have an e ect at di erent times before an election is held, while there appears to be considerable similarity b e t w een the di erent second order elections. According to SIC, second order elections might h a v e no e ect at all, or the importance of the rst order elections might be questioned.
Time-varying autoregressive parameters
While the models discussed in the previous subsection appear to provide quite convincing and intuitive results for the impact of elections on the number of undecided voters, they are Although some of the estimates of the autoregressive parameters are not signi cant, we decide not to simplify this model, but instead focus again on the output of the hidden units. The activation functions F u;j are examined to assess the impact of elections. Figure  4 shows the individual activation functions, again multiplied by 10, while in Figure 5 they are graphed for all elections simultaneously. The output is seen to correspond quite closely with the results from model 2 see also Table 2 . The main di erence occurs in the hidden unit corresponding to the elections for City-councils: the estimate of the constant u;CC is now equal to u;CC = 0:9890:076, which implies that activity of the hidden unit is restricted to 2 weeks prior to elections. Again, the impact of elections in terms of magnitude of decrease can beestimated by computing the di erence in the expected value of y t due to the activity of the corresponding hidden unit. Note that the impact now is computed as, Using the estimates in 6, the impact of elections for National and European Parliaments, Provincial States, and City-councils in the week the elections are being held, I j y T , are estimated to be 18.92, 8.18, 3.11, and 5.45 percentage points in absolute value. These estimates di er considerably from the impact estimates based on the ANN 4, and perhaps appear to be somewhat more reasonable. The same restrictions with respect to existence and timing of the e ect of elections as in the previous subsection have been examined by estimating di erent special cases of the MNN 3. The values of the model selection criteria are given in the two rightmost columns of Table 3 . It appears that this time the AIC favors the model in which the timing of second order election e ects are identical, while the SIC prefers the model in which n o distinction is made between rst and second order elections.
Conclusions and discussion
While our results may not be surprising, they do represent, to the best of our knowledge, the rst quantitative estimates of short-term cycles in self-reported vote intention. The ANNs models reported here demonstrate that rst and second order Dutch elections have an unequal impact on the timing of vote decisions of undecided voters and on the change of the size of this group in the nal few weeks before election. The estimates show that undecided Dutch v oters begin to make up their minds nine weeks before a rst order national parliamentary election and one Provincial States to four weeks European Parliament and City-councils before a second order election. Whereas rst order national parliamentary elections drive up the proportion of voters considerably, second order elections expand this group by a few percentage points only.
At the outset of this paper, we reviewed several possible explanations for this cyclical pattern in vote intention. They all lead to the suspicion that the electoral cycles re ect the impact of party campaigning. They are so closely t to the election dates that they leave little room for additional explanation. Why else should vote intention behave in this fashion and with such regularity? Hence while the analysis presented here does not directly speak to this question, the results suggest that the electoral cycles are the time-related e ects of time-related campaigns.
Election campaigns have for a long time been thought t o h a v e limited e ects on voters because partisan precommitment of early deciders would be su cient to preclude campaign e ects and because the remainder of the voters, who are presumed to lack interest in political news, would lack exposure to the campaign. Indeed, Cha ee and Choe 1980 and Whitney and Goldman 1985 show that precommitted voters or already-decided partisans are also those least likely to be swayed by campaign messages. These people have already decided on a candidate or party before the campaign gets underway and they attend media reports only to reinforce existing preferences. However, the authors also nd that in the absence of a precampaign decision, those exposed to the heavy ow of information during the campaign decide primarily on the basis of this information see also Caldeira, Clausen, and Patterson, 1990 , Bowen 1994 , and Finkel and Schrott 1995 It is the undecided, those who make their decision during the conduct of the campaign, who are most a ected by the campaign message. Obviously, if parties are to win, they must both mobilize their existing support and reach out to those who have not yet decided. As the undecided voters are often the key to a winning election, they are a major target for electoral campaigns. In the Netherlands there is no legally recognized, o cial, or formal campaign period prior to the election. Dutch election law only requires that the nomination of candidates be established seven weeks before polling day. Election campaigns for the National Parliament generally include only the nal three or four weeks before the election, but in the`pre-campaign' period parties have already nominated their candidates and leader, and presented their election program to the electorate.
Huckfeld and Sprague 1992 show that active campaigns are more e ective at getting the votes out than moribund campaigns. This explains why in rst order national parliamentary elections undecided voters make up their minds earlier than in second order elections and why there are many rst-order-election-only voters. The strategic e orts of political parties and their leaders and the features of a particular campaign environment a ect the timing of participation and thus the aggregate rise and fall of participation within and across electoral cycles. In more-at-stake rst order elections the amount and quality o f campaigning and partisan e orts, television time given to parties, and media coverage are typically greater than in less-at-stake second order elections. The latter, particularly the Euro elections, generally have very little appeal for party activists. One could therefore also argue that campaign e orts are more important at second order elections than at rst order elections. In the latter, there is generally much more attention given by the public media as well as voters, because the entire political life of the country is focused on this event.
The results also suggest some implications for political analysis. Several election analysts have shown that the percentage of survey respondents who say that they will vote consistently outnumbers o cial turnout statistics. Similarly, respondents to post-election surveys claim retrospectively higher turnout voting than actually occurred see Anderson and Silver 1986 , Sigelman 1982 , Hill and Hurley 1984 , Swaddle and Heath 1989 , Smeets 1995 , and Marsh 1985 . This study has made some progress on previous research by showing that the point in time a particular survey is conducted substantially a ects the estimates of self-reported vote intention. Surveys administered in between elections may even underestimate actual turnout, sometimes quite dramatically so. In the same vein, comparative studies of survey-based turnout longitudinal as well as cross-national should pay close attention to the timing of the surveys used in the comparison 8 . Last but by n o means least, this paper has shown that arti cial neural network models ANNs do not necessarily have to betreated as a black box. They can explicitly be used for inference. Needless to say that this depends in part on the research problem at hand.
8
Examples of cross-national comparative studies of voter turnout, either based on survey data or o cial statistics, are Powell 1986 , Pettersen 1989 , Flickinger and Studlar 1992 , Armingeon 1994 , Hirczy 1994 , Jackman and Miller 1995 , and Pacek and Radcli 1995 Estimates of the constants in the activation functions in the ANN model 4 and the MNN model 6. NP = National Parliament, EP = European Parliament, PS = Provincial States, CC = City-council. 
